A strategic model of job arrivals to a single machine with earliness and
  tardiness penalties by Glazer, Amihai et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
70
1.
04
77
6v
2 
 [c
s.G
T]
  1
5 O
ct 
20
17
A strategic model of job arrivals to a single machine
with earliness and tardiness penalties∗
Amihai Glazer†, Refael Hassin‡and Liron Ravner§
October 17, 2017
Abstract
We consider a game of decentralized timing of jobs to a single server (machine)
with a penalty for deviation from a due date, and no delay costs. The jobs’ sizes
are homogeneous and deterministic. Each job belongs to a single decision maker,
a customer, who aims to arrive at a time that minimizes his deviation penalty. If
multiple customers arrive at the same time then their order of service is determined
by a uniform random draw. We show that if the cost function has a weighted absolute
deviation form then any Nash equilibrium is pure and symmetric, that is, all customers
arrive together. Furthermore, we show that there exist multiple, in fact a continuum,
of equilibrium arrival times, and provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the
socially optimal arrival time to be an equilibrium. The base model is solved explicitly,
but the prevalence of a pure symmetric equilibrium is shown to be robust to several
relaxations of the assumptions: restricted server availability, inclusion of small waiting
costs, stochastic job sizes, randomly sized population, heterogeneous due dates, and
non-linear deviation penalties.
1 Introduction
This paper complements the classical machine timing/sequencing problem with a common
due date and earliness and tardiness penalties. Prior analyses focused on centralized analysis,
that is, a single decision maker determining the schedule for all jobs. We extend that work
by analyzing a decentralized setting in which each job is a rational agent; the centralized
socially optimal schedule is a benchmark for comparison.
More specifically, we study a single server system with customers sending their jobs to
be processed in a single-machine shop according to a first-come first-served (FCFS) order.
Jobs that arrive simultaneously are randomly ordered. Customers have desired due dates
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for processing their jobs; but the actual start time depends on their arrival times relative
to the others, as dictated by the FCFS regime. Thus a game results where the players
are the customers, the strategies are the arrival times to the system, and each player aims
to minimize his expected earliness and tardiness penalties. Our model extends the vast
literature on scheduling jobs subject to due dates, by assuming that jobs belong to individual
agents who are rational and act strategically to maximize their utilities.
We assume that the number of customers is finite and each has a single job. When
some customers arrive together they are ordered according to a uniform random draw. If all
customers have a common due date, or close due dates, then arriving together with other
customers is potentially beneficial because in expectation every customer is in the “middle,”
which may be closer to the due date than arriving before or after everyone else. If the
job sizes of the customers are deterministic and the cost function is a weighted absolute
deviation, i.e. some linear penalty for early service and a possibly different linear penalty for
late service, we find that simultaneous arrivals (clustering) is the only possible equilibrium.
The equilibrium arrival time is not unique, but rather there is a whole interval such that
if all customers arrive at any time within that interval then no customer has an incentive
to deviate. Moreover, the socially optimal arrival time often lies within this interval and is
therefore an equilibrium. Specifically this holds if the earliness and tardiness penalties are
not too different. Simple explicit necessary and sufficient conditions are given below.
A general framework for classical machine timing/sequencing problem with a single server
and weighted penalties is presented and analysed in [18]. Surveys of the research on these
problems can be found in [7] and [20]. Our work also relates to the research on decentralized
multi-machine routing games ([10],[12] and [6]), where the decision variable for the individual
jobs is the choice of machine and not a timing decision.
Our base model assumes linear penalties, deterministic population and job sizes, no
waiting costs, common due dates and unrestricted machine availability. It is thus tractable
and yields explicit results. The equilibrium solution of simultaneous arrivals, however, is
valid for a more general decentralized job timing game. Specifically the due dates need not
be common, but rather close enough, the cost function needs to be unimodal, there may
be small waiting costs and the job sizes and population sizes may be random. We explore
all of these possibilities. We further show how the equilibrium outcome is modified if the
server is only available for a restricted period of time. We also present examples for which
a symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium does not exist. Relaxing the assumptions of the base
model is important to show that the results are robust for more realistic machine scheduling
settings (heterogeneous due dates or deviation penalties and restricted availability), and for
other applications such as queueing (stochastic population and job sizes) and transportation
(waiting costs).
The next section reviews relevant literature. Section 3 defines the base model. This is
followed by deriving the socially optimal solution in Section 4, equilibrium analysis in Section
5 and sensitivity analysis in Section 6.
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2 Literature
Our paper considers the time at which a strategic customer chooses to join a queue, with a
first-come first-served order of service. A customer does not care how long he stays in the
queue, but does care about the time at which he is served. Even if a customer does not care
about when he is served, he may care about when he joins the queue because that affects
his waiting time. An arrival-time game to a discrete stochastic queue first appeared in [16],
which introduced the ?/M/1 model: each customer chooses when to arrive at a single-server
queue that starts operating at some known time, aiming to minimize his minimizing waiting
costs. A related problem concerns the concert queuing game, where customers seek service
at a first-come first-served queueing system that opens at a given time, with a customer’s
utility depending on when he gets service and how long he waits in the queue [24]. For
a server with no defined starting time or ending time, customers who care only about the
length of time they are in the queue will spread themselves out as much as possible [26].
This model has been extended in many directions: batch service [17], loss systems [32, 22],
no early arrivals [19], and a network of queues [23]. We find that customers who instead care
about the time at which they are served will concentrate their arrival times.
Queueing models which consider the timing of arrivals have incorporated tardiness penal-
ties, [24, 21], order penalties [36], and earliness penalties [39]. In [37] a deterministic pro-
cessor sharing system with heterogeneous due dates is considered, and the pure-strategy
equilibrium arrival times are derived, explicitly for some examples, and algorithmically for
the general case. The latter model resembles ours in having customers who arrive together
“helping” each achieve his due date, however arrivals do not cluster. The arrival game to a
last-come-first-served system is studied by [35], who experimentally compare several service-
order policies provided in [8]. A key feature in all of the above is that the equilibrium solution
is given by a mixed strategy, that is, customers randomize their arrival times. Furthermore,
the arrival distribution has no atoms (except for boundary cases), because arriving together
with other customers is never desirable.
Work in transportation (which rarely cites the work on queues) considers a bottleneck,
such as a bridge, with a commuter’s costs increasing with the time he spends on the road, and
incurring a cost if he arrives at his destination too early or too late ([41] and [4]). The choice
of departure time in transportation is analyzed in [5], who introduce a model with masses
of customers departing together. They assume a fluid population with the Greenshield’s
congestion dynamics (e.g. [30]), which are, at least from a technical perspective, close to the
dynamics of processor sharing queue, in the sense that all customers travelling together are
slowed as congestion increases.
Work in economics has, like us, addressed issues of timing, but unlike us does not consider
customers served in the order in which they arrive. A concern in this literature is whether
agents will cluster, all taking action at the same time; another concern has been whether
an agent benefits from acting before or instead after others do. Some authors show how
the first entrant into an industry can earn larger profits than later entrants, a result called
the pioneer’s advantage [38], the first-mover advantage [29], and order of market entry effect
[25]. Arriving last is desirable in the advertisement board timeline game of [1], where the
last advertisement posted is the most visible.
Researchers have also considered payoffs which depend on the order of arrivals. Delay
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may be costly, with each player preferring that others act before him. [40] formalized such
a situation, where two animals fight over a fallen prey, with the first to give up losing,
and with fighting costly for both. The situation may be reversed,with the passage of time
exogenously beneficial, and players wishing to pre-empt others. In the “grab-the-dollar”
game a player can either grab the money on the table or wait for one more period, with the
pot increasing over time. Each player wants to be the first to take the money, but would
rather grab a larger pot. The idea has been applied to firms’ decisions about when to adopt
a new technology [13], and about when to enter a market [15]. When a firm should make
an irreversible investment, where the return per period decreases with the number of firms
that have invested, and with the cost of investment decreasing over time, is modelled by
[3]. A result is that the firms may cluster, even in the absence of coordination failures,
informational spillovers, or positive payoff externalities. That result resembles ours, but in a
very different context. For clustering arising from coordination failures, see [28]. For effects
of positive network externalities see [31], and for informational spillovers see [11], and [9].
Or players may prefer to be neither first nor last; that general situation where rewards
depend on the players’ ordinal rank of timing action is modeled by [34] and by [2]. We too
have order matter, but not by assumption but because customers have preferences over when
they are served, and the order in which a customer arrives affects when he is served.
3 Model
Consider n customers, each with a single job to be processed by a single server. Serving a
single job takes one unit of time. The ideal service start time for customer i = 1, . . . , n, is
di (due date). If customer i commences service at time s then his earliness time is
Ei(s) = (di − s)
+ = max{0, di − s}.
His tardiness time is
Ti(s) = (s− di)
+ = max{0, s− di} .
The deviation cost incurred is
DCi(s) = γEi(s) + βTi(s), i = 1, . . . , n , (1)
where β is the marginal lateness cost and γ is the marginal earliness cost. In the case of
symmetric deviation penalties, γ = β, the cost function is simply the absolute deviation
from the due date multiplied by a constant.
In the classical scheduling setting a central decision maker selects a sequence of service
start times (s1, . . . , sn) that minimizes the total weighted deviation cost,
n∑
i=1
DCi(si) = γ
∑
i∈E
|si|+ β
∑
i∈T
si ,
where E = {i : Ei > 0} is the set of early jobs and T = {i : Ti ≥ 0} is the set of tardy
jobs. The solution of the centralized problem will be detailed in Section 4 and will serve as
a benchmark for the following decentralized analysis.
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In the decentralized setting each customer decides when to send his job to the system.
We adopt the standard definition of a Nash equilibrium. That requires two conditions. First,
each customer maximizes his expected utility, given his beliefs about what other customers
will do, by choosing when to send his job. Second, each customer’s beliefs are rational – he
does not believe that some customer will send a job at a time which that customer would
avoid. Such an equilibrium can arise in at least two plausible ways. First, each customer
can calculate, as we do, what are equilibrium times, and behave accordingly. Second, each
customer may observe when others sent jobs in the past, or when customer sent jobs at
other similar facilities, and so, having such information, decide when is the best time for
himself to send a job. An equilibrium will then be self-sustaining—the times of submission
are described by the equilibrium (that is what customers observed in the past or at other
facilities), and each customer has an incentive to send a job at a time described by the
equilibrium. Moreover, as is standard in analyses of Nash equilibria, a customer’s behavior
may be described by a probability that he will send a job at any stated time; customers
then have beliefs about the probabilities adopted by other customers. Formally, an action
of customer i is an arrival time ti ∈ A, where A denotes the interval of time that the server
is available. A mixed strategy is a probability distribution of arrival times, i.e., a random
variable with a cdf Fi such that Fi(A) = 1.
The server admits jobs according to a FCFS regime. Multiple jobs that arrive at the
same instant are admitted into service in uniform random order. Hence, for a given arrival
profile t = (t1, . . . , tn) the effective time of admittance into service depends on the arrival of
others and on the lottery for order for jobs arriving together in clusters. To demonstrate the
system dynamics, consider an ordered profile of arrivals: t1 ≤ t2 ≤ · · · ≤ tn, where the order
already takes into account the lottery for simultaneous arrivals. The first job is admitted
immediately:
s1 = t1 .
If the server is idle the subsequent jobs are admitted when they arrive. If the server is busy
they are admitted immediately after the previous job is completed :
sj = max{sj−1 + 1, tj} 1 < j ≤ n .
Let Si(t) denote the random variable of the start time for job i given the arrival profile
t. The expected deviation cost (1) of customer i is
ci(t) = E [DCi(Si(t))] , (2)
where the expectation accounts for both the lottery for order among simultaneous arrivals
and the randomization of arrival times when some customers used mixed strategies.
To summarize, the dynamics of the non-cooperative game are as follows:
(a) Customers simultaneously decide when to send their jobs.
(b) The server starts working when the first job arrives.
(c) Jobs arriving at a busy server form a FCFS queue.
(d) Jobs arriving simultaneously are randomly ordered at the end of the queue.
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(e) Customers pay a penalty for deviation of their service start time from the due date.
Remark. We assume that the due date is for the service start time, as is common in queueing
models (e.g. [21]), and not completion time, as is common in the scheduling literature. When
service times are deterministic this clearly does not affect the outcome in both the centralized
and decentralized settings. When service times are stochastic the distinction needs to be
treated with more care.
Base model assumptions:
1. Homogeneous due date, di = 0, ∀i = 1, . . . , n.
2. Unrestricted server availability, A = (−∞,∞).
These assumptions are appropriate for a system that is available for a long time. In
standard scheduling models the server becomes available at t = 0 and the the due date is some
positive time d > 0. If the server is available for long enough we can normalize the due date to
zero, thereby simplifying the presentation of the analysis. Section 6 examines the implications
of these assumptions, among other extensions, and shows that the equilibrium results of
the base model still hold in many cases. In particular, Section 6.1 considers availability
restrictions to the system and Section 6.5 examines the consequences of heterogeneous due
dates.
4 Social optimization
A central planner seeking to minimize the total cost,
TC(t) =
n∑
i=1
ci(t) ,
can obtain any possible sequence of service start times by setting arrival times at a distance
of at least 1 from each other. Therefore the social optimization problem is the classical
sequencing problem,
min
(s1,...,sn)
n∑
i=1
[γEi(si) + βTi(si)] ,
s.t. si ≥ si−1 + 1, i = 2, . . . , n .
Note, however, that the identical sequence of start times can be achieved by several
arrival profiles, for example two customers arriving at the same instant will yield the same
sequence as that of one arriving exactly a unit after the other.
We next show that with a common due-date the optimal service sequence is any sequence
with no idle time such that 0 is the β
β+γ
percentile of the sequence. In other words the
proportion of early jobs is β
β+γ
. This result arises because the objective function is the
sum of absolute deviations from zero with different weights for negative and positive values.
Proposition 1 is a standard result in single machine sequencing (e.g. [7]). Nevertheless, we
provide the statement and proof for our specific formulation for completeness and for easy
comparison to the subsequent equilibrium analysis.
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Proposition 1. Let s˜ := nβ
β+γ
. A sequence of service start times is optimal if and only if
si = si−1 + 1, i = 2, . . . , n ,
and
1. if s˜ ∈ N then
s1 ∈ [−s˜,−s˜+ 1] ,
2. if s˜ /∈ N then
s1 = −⌊s˜⌋ .
Proof. Without loss of generality let s1 ≤ s2 ≤ · · · ≤ sn. Because di = 0 for all i = 1, . . . , n,
then (2) yields
ci(s) = DCi(s) = |s|(β1{s>0} + γ1{s<0}) ,
where 1A is the indicator function on condition A. An optimal service sequence has no idle
time between jobs; that is, the sequence satisfies
si = si−1 + 1 = s1 + i− 1, ∀i ≥ 2 .
This result holds because if the server were idle at some time, for instance after job i such
that si < 0, then the earliness penalty of all jobs up to i can be reduced by shifting them
forward until there is no idle time. This shift does affect the start time of subsequent jobs.
The reverse argument can be used for si > 0.
Hence there is a single decision variable: s1. Denoting i0 := max{i : si ≤ 0}, the total
cost function is
TC(s1) =
n∑
i=i0+1
β(s1 + (i− 1))−
i0∑
i=1
γ(s1 + (i− 1))
=
(
β(n− i0)− γi0
)
s1 +
n∑
i=i0+1
β(i− 1)−
i0∑
i=1
γ(i− 1) .
Note that i0 depends on the choice of s1. Therefore, the cost function is piecewise affine
with respect to s1, with the slope determined by i0: β(n− i0) − γi0. The slope is negative
if i0 > n
β
β+γ
, positive if i0 < n
β
β+γ
, and zero if i0 = n
β
β+γ
(in case this is indeed an integer).
Therefore, if nβ
β+γ
∈ N then any s1 satisfying
i0 = max{i : s1 + i− 1 ≤ 0} =
nβ
β + γ
,
or equivalently,
−
nβ
β + γ
≤ s1 ≤ −
nβ
β + γ
+ 1 ,
is optimal. Otherwise, if nβ
β+γ
/∈ N then the objective function has a global optimum that
satisfies
nβ
β + γ
< i0 = max{i : s1 + i− 1 ≤ 0} <
nβ
β + γ
+ 1 ,
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and s1 + i0 − 1 = 0. Hence, we conclude that i0 =
⌈
nβ
β+γ
⌉
, and lastly, that
s1 = −
⌈
nβ
β + γ
⌉
+ 1 = −
⌊
nβ
β + γ
⌋
− 1 + 1 =
⌊
nβ
β + γ
⌋
.
Corollary 2. If β = γ then a sequence of service start times si = s1 + i − 1 is optimal if
and only if zero is a median of the sequence.
5 Equilibrium analysis
An arrival profile t = (t1, . . . , tn) is a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium if
ci(t) ≤ ci(t1, . . . , t
′
i, . . . , tn), ∀t
′
i ∈ A, i = 1, . . . , n .
This means that the arrival profile is stable in the sense that no single customer can reduce
his expected deviation penalty by sending his job at a different time.
5.1 Two-customer game
Consider first a two-customer example with symmetric deviation penalties: n = 2 and β = γ.
In this case t1 = t2 = −
1
2
is the unique pure strategy equilibrium with both customers
incurring a cost of β
2
. No customer has an incentive to deviate because arriving during(
− 1
2
, 1
2
]
will cost exactly β
2
; arriving later or earlier than this interval is clearly more costly.
The uniqueness can be derived by considering the best-response function to any arrival t by
the other customer (we use the notation t− to indicate that arriving momentarily before the
other customer is optimal):
b(t) =


0, t > 0,
t− , −1
2
< t ≤ 0,
[
−1
2
, 1
2
]
, t = −1
2
,
(t, 1 + t] , −1 ≤ t < −1
2
0, t < −1.
The best-response is not necessarily unique. The pair of arrival times (t1, t2) is an equilibrium
if t1 ∈ b(t2) and t2 ∈ b(t1). Indeed, t1 = t2 = −
1
2
is the only pair that satisfies this condition.
This is illustrated for symmetric strategies in Figure 1. We conclude that the only stable pair
is −1
2
for both customers. Furthermore, the service start times in equilibrium are socially
optimal.
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b(t) = 1 + t
b(t) = t−
b(t) = 0
t
te = −1
2
Figure 1: Example: n = 2 and β = γ. Best response to the arrival time t of the second
customer. The only fixed point is the discontinuity point at t = −1
2
. The solid red line and
the dotted region is the best response function b(t).
5.2 General equilibrium properties
Consider next the equilibrium for any finite number of homogeneous customers and any
β, γ > 0. It turns out that the set of pure-strategy equilibria includes only symmetric
equilibria, and is given by an interval of arrival times τ = [t, t]. That is, for any t ∈ τ all
customers simultaneously arriving at time t is an equilibrium. Before stating the main result
we prove several useful lemmas. All proofs are given in the Appendix.
Lemma 3. Any equilibrium arrival profile satisfies the following:
(a) The first customer arrives at some ta < 0 and the last customer enters service at some
tb > 0.
(b) The server operates continuously during the interval [ta, tb].
Lemma 4. There is no asymmetric pure or mixed strategy equilibrium.
Lemma 5. There is no symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium.
The conclusion of this section is that any Nash equilibrium is pure and symmetric, that
is, it is given by a single arrival time for all customers. In the following we will characterize
all such equilibria and explore when the socially optimal solution is also an equilibrium.
5.3 Symmetric equilibrium
If all customers arrive at time t < 0 then the expected cost for each of them is determined
by the uniform random ordering, resulting in a cost of
n−1∑
i=0
t+ i
n
[
β1{t+i≥0} − γ1{t+i<0}
]
.
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If properties (a) and (b) of Lemma 3 are satisfied, then a single customer has two reasonable
options to deviate: arriving before everyone else and incurring a cost of at least −γt, or
obtaining service after all others have completed their service with a cost of at least β(t +
n−1). The latter cost can be achieved by arriving at any time during the interval (t, t+n−1].
Hence, the expected cost of choosing time s when all others play t is
c(s; t) =


−γs, s < t,
1
n
[
β
∑n−1
i=it+1
(t+ i)− γ
∑it
i=0(t+ i)
]
, s = t,
βmax{t+ n− 1, s}, s > t,
(3)
where it := max{i : t+ i < 0}.
For t to be a symmetric equilibrium the costs associated with deviating from t must
exceed the expected cost associated with arriving at t with all the others. An immediate
symmetric equilibrium te is given by
−γte = β(te + n− 1)⇔ te = −(n− 1)
β
β + γ
.
This is an equilibrium because from (3) we have that
c(te; te) = −
1
n
γte +
1
n
[
β
n−2∑
i=ite+1
(te + i)− γ
ite∑
i=1
(te + i)
]
+
1
n
β(te + n− 1)
≤ β(te + n− 1) = −γte ,
as every element in the interior sums is smaller than the first and last elements (the start
times are closer to zero), and therefore neither arriving before nor after all others benefits
any one customer.
The above equilibrium is unique for n = 2 but not in the general case. For example,
suppose that all arrive at te + ǫ for some small ǫ > 0. If n > 2 then by continuity of the
cost function both extremal costs exceed the expected cost obtained by arriving at te. This
behaviour is illustrated for an example with n = 5 in Figure 2.
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t t
c(t; t)
−γt
β(t+ n− 1)
te = −2
Figure 2: The cost of all customers arriving simultaneously at t, i.e. c(t; t), compared with
the cost a single customer can obtain by either deviation: −γt by arriving a moment before,
or β(t + n − 1) by arriving after all are served. Arriving at t is a best response to all
others arriving at t along the interval (−2.66,−1.33) where both deviations are more costly.
Example parameters: n = 5, β = γ = 1.
We can now fully characterize all possible equilibria.
Proposition 6. Let t be the unique solution of β(t + n − 1) = c(t; t); let t be the unique
solution of −γt = c(t; t). The set of all equilibria is given by the pure and symmetric strategies
of all customers arriving together at time t, such that
t ∈ τ e = [t, t] ⊂ (−(n− 1), 0) .
Proof. By Lemma 3a, t is not an equilibrium if t ≥ 0 or t ≤ −(n − 1). The equation
β(t+ n− 1) = c(t; t) has a solution t ∈ (−(n− 1), 0) because by (3), c(0; 0) < (n− 1)β and
c(−(n − 1);−(n − 1)) > 0. The cost function (3) is piecewise linear with respect to t, with
a slope of
a(t) =
β(n− 1− it)− γit
n
,
where it := max{i : t + i < 0} ≥ 0. Further, t ∈ (−(n − 1), 0) implies it ∈ (0, (n− 1)) and
therefore a(t) < β, which in turn implies that the solution t of β(t+n−1) = c(t; t) is unique.
Similarly, as c(0; 0) > 0, c(−(n − 1),−(n − 1)) < (n − 1)γ and |a(t)| < γ we conclude that
−γt = c(t; t) admits a unique solution, t. Furthermore, β(t+ n− 1) ≥ c(t; t) is satisfied for
any t ≥ t, and −γt ≥ c(t; t) is satisfied for any t ≤ t. We conclude that the interval τ is the
set of all equilibria with pure symmetric strategies. The interval is not empty because we
already saw that te = −(n− 1) β
β+γ
is always an equilibrium.
Observe that for n = 2 there is a unique solution te = − β
β+γ
, and in particular te = −1
2
for β = γ, as was shown in Section 5.1. Proposition 1 characterized the socially optimal
sequence of service start times, which can be achieved, for example, by a symmetric strategy
of all arriving at s˜, i.e., at the optimal first service time. Denote this socially-optimal strategy
by t∗ := s˜. It turns out that the social optimum is often an equilibrium, but not always, as
is illustrated by an example in Figure 3. We next give necessary and sufficient conditions
for the socially optimal solution to be an equilibrium, with the proof in the Appendix.
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c(t; t)
−γt
β(t+ n− 1)
tet∗ = −4
Figure 3: The cost of all customers arriving simultaneously at t, i.e. c(t; t), compared with the cost a single
customer can obtain by either deviation: −γt by arriving a moment before, or β(t+n−1) by arriving after all
are served. Arriving at t is a best response to all others arriving at t along the interval τe = (−3.58,−2.67)
where both deviations are more costly. However the minimal total cost is attained at t∗ = −4 as c(t; t) is an
increasing function. Example parameters: n = 5, β = 5, γ = 1.
Proposition 7. There exists a socially optimal symmetric arrival time that is also an equi-
librium if and only if β
β+γ
∈
[
1
n
, 1− 1
n
]
.
Proposition 7 implies that equilibrium clustering of arrival times is often efficient. Specif-
ically, when n is not very small there is a socially optimal equilibrium for almost all values of
β and γ. This means that when the penalty function is fairly symmetric there is a socially
optimal equilibrium. But when the penalty is heavily skewed in one direction the equilib-
rium arrivals are too early (small β
β+γ
) or too late (large β
β+γ
). This is illustrated in Figure
4. Furthermore, note that even if for many parameter values there is a socially optimal equi-
librium, welfare under most of the equilibria is less than under the socially optimal solution.
In particular, the price of stability, which is the ratio between the total costs of the best
equilibrium and the social optimum, is typically one, whereas for n > 2 the price of anarchy,
which is the ratio between the total costs of the worst equilibrium and the social optimum,
exceeds 1.
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Figure 4: Range of parameter values (red dotted lines) such that there is a socially optimal
equilibrium.
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6 Sensitivity analysis
It is interesting to explore what assumptions are crucial for the existence of the pure and
symmetric equilibria. We consider some possible deviations from the assumptions in the
basic model.
6.1 Restricted server availability
Suppose that the sever only admits jobs into the queue during the interval A = [a, b]. We
assume that all jobs in the queue at time b are served so the server may still operate after b
even though no new jobs are allowed to join.
Recall that by Proposition 6 the set of pure strategy equilibria satisfies τ e ⊂
(
− 1
n−1
, 0
)
.
Therefore, if a ≤ − 1
n−1
and b ≥ 0 then the equilibrium outcome is the same as in the
base model. In fact, this identity holds if a ≤ t and b ≥ t, where the thresholds are as
defined in Proposition 6. The more interesting cases occur when the interval of equilibrium
arrival times in the base model is partially or fully unavailable. In the next proposition we
characterize all possible equilibria for the restricted server availability model.
Proposition 8. Let τ r = [a, b] ∩ τ e, where τ e = [t, t] as defined in Proposition 6.
(a) If τ r 6= ∅ then τ r is the set of all pure-strategy equilibria.
(b) If τ r = ∅ and a > t then all arriving at t = a is the unique pure-strategy equilibrium.
(c) If τ r = ∅ and b < t then all arriving at t = b is the unique pure-strategy equilibrium.
Remark. Proposition 8 shows that the restricted model may have different equilibrium out-
comes than the base model. For example, if b < t then no arrivals are allowed during
the interval of base model equilibria and τ r = ∅. Part (c) of the proposition implies that
t = b /∈ τ e is the unique equilibrium. However, when any segment of the base model equilib-
rium interval is available, i.e., τ r 6= ∅, then any equilibrium in the restricted model is also
an equilibrium in the base model.
6.2 Waiting cost
We define the waiting time insensitivity cost as follows: suppose that there is a penalty of
α > 0 per unit of waiting time in the queue until service commences. We claim that if n > 2
there is still an interval of pure symmetric equilibrium arrival times for α sufficiently small.
Consider the homogeneous two-customer example: n = 2 and β = γ. If both customers
arrive at t = −1
2
then each individual’s cost is
1
2
(
α · 0 + β ·
1
2
)
+
1
2
(
α · 1 + β ·
1
2
)
=
1
2
(β + α).
This is not an equilibrium because arriving ǫ < α before −1
2
will reduce the cost to 1
2
(β+ ǫ).
Therefore that equilibrium is possible only with mixed strategies that are given by continuous
distributions of arrival times (i.e. no atoms).
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If, however, n > 2 then te = −(n − 1) β
β+γ
is still an equilibrium for sufficiently small α.
Using the notation of Section 5, the cost to an individual customer when all arrive at time
t is
cα(t; t) = c(t; t) +
α
n
n−1∑
i=0
i = c(t; t) + α
n− 1
2
α→0
−−→ c(t; t) ,
where c(t; t) is given by (3). Recall that te was the time that ensured that the first and last
customers in the realised random draw incur a cost of exactly −γte. Hence, if α is small then
arriving a moment before te or at te+n−1 yields a cost of −γte, which exceeds c(te; te)+αn−1
2
for small enough α. Furthermore, by continuity there is an interval of equilibrium points
τα = [t, t] (see Proposition 6), where the interval bounds depend on α as follows,
t = inf
{
t < 0 : β(t+ n− 1)− α
n− 1
2
≥ c(t; t)
}
,
t = sup
{
t < 0 : −γt− α
n− 1
2
≥ c(t; t)
}
.
In particular, the interval of equilibria shrinks with α; that is, τα1 ⊂ τα2 ⊂ τ 0 for any
α > α1 > α2 > 0, where α is the highest waiting penalty that still attains a pure equilibrium
(which is unique because t = t).
6.3 Stochastic service times
Let G be the common cdf of a customer’s service time. We will present two examples that
show that the atomic solution of all arriving together is still an equilibrium for some service
distributions, but not for all. The first example is a two-customer game with two possible
service times, which can be thought of as ‘high’ and ‘low’, with each customer independently
drawing one of them with probability 1/2. In this case there always exists a symmetric pure
strategy equilibrium. The next example has exponential service times. We show that for
n = 2 there is no pure-strategy equilibrium, but for n > 2 there is an interval of symmetric
equilibria.
Example 1. n = 2 and discrete uniform service times with two possible service lengths
{a, b}, without loss of generality a = 1 and b = 2, given by
G(x) =


0, x < 1,
1
2
, 1 ≤ x < 2,
1, x ≥ 2.
The unique symmetric pure equilibrium is
te =


− 3β
2(β+γ)
, β ≤ 2γ,
−2β−γ
β+γ
, β > 2γ.
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Suppose that customer 2 arrives at t ∈ (−1, 0); then customer 1 has four reasonable arrival
times
(a) A moment, say ǫ, before t, with a cost of −γt + γǫ.
(b) At exactly t, with a cost of
−
1
2
γt+
1
2
[
1
2
β(t+ 1) +
1
2
β(t+ 2)
]
.
(c) At t+ 1, with a cost of
1
2
β(t+ 1) +
1
2
β(t+ 2) .
(d) At t+ 2, with a cost of β(t+ 2).
Clearly, (d) is worse than (c) for any γ and β. If β ≤ 2γ the value te = − 3β
2(β+γ)
ensures that
the cost (c) is −γte, and consequentially is the same as (b). In this case deviating to (a)
is sub-optimal for any ǫ > 0. Indeed, the best response function has the same form as the
deterministic service example illustrated in Figure 1.
The case of β > 2γ can be verified using similar arguments.
Example 2. Consider n customers with independent exponential service times, G(x) =
1 − e−x. Denote the convolution of k service times by Yk =
∑k
i=1Xi, where Xi ∼ Exp(1),
and note that Yk follows an Erlang distribution with parameters (k, 1). If all arrive at time
t < 0 then the expected cost for each customer is
cG(t; t) =
1
n
[
−γ
(
t +
n−1∑
i=1
∫ −t
0
(t + s)
si−1e−s
(i− 1)!
ds
)
+ β
n−1∑
i=1
∫ ∞
−t
(t+ s)
si−1e−s
(i− 1)!
ds
]
=
1
n
[
− γt− γ
n−1∑
i=1
(tP(Yi ≤ −t) + iP(Yi+1 ≤ −t))
+ β
n−1∑
i=1
(tP(Yi > −t) + iP(Yi+1 > −t))
]
.
For any symmetric arrival time t < 0 there are two reasonable options for a single
customer to deviate: arriving momentarily before t with a cost of ≈ −γt; arriving at s = 0
which yields a cost that is at least as small as any s > 0 for every realization of the service
times and strictly smaller than the cost incurred by arriving at s ∈ (t, 0). When deviating
to s = 0 the expected cost is
cG(0; t) = β
∫ ∞
−t
(t+ s)
sn−2e−s
(n− 2)!
ds = β(tP(Yn−1 > −t) + (n− 1) P(Yn > −t)) .
Therefore, the set of pure symmetric equilibria is given by the interval τ = [t, t], where
t = inf{t < 0 : cG(0, t) ≥ cG(t; t)} and t = sup{t < 0 : −γt ≥ cG(t; t)}.
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For n = 2 and t < 0,
cG(t; t) = −
1
2
γt+
1
2
[
−γ(1 + t) + (β + γ)et
]
,
and
cG(0; t) = βe
t .
Equating −γt = c(t; t) yields
t = log
(
γ
β + γ
)
,
i.e., if a customer arrives at t ∈
(
log
(
γ
β+γ
)
, 0
]
then the other customer will arrive a moment
earlier. However, for any t ≤ t we have
cG(0; t) = βe
t < −γ(1 + t) + (β + γ)et ≤ cG(t; t) ,
and thus t < t and τ = ∅. We conclude that there is no pure symmetric equilibrium in the
two-customer game with exponential service times.
Numerical analysis suggests that n = 2 is the exception and that for n > 2 there is always
an interval of pure and symmetric equilibria, as in section 5.3. N
The above examples show that with a stochastic service time equilibria in pure strategies
may not exist, but such scenarios need to be carefully constructed. In general, for n > 2
multiple equilibria may exist; characterizing all of them is likely to involve elaborate analysis
of multiple parameter cases.
6.4 Random population size
Let N be a random variable representing the number of arriving customers; denote the
corresponding pdf by πn = P(N = n). This is equivalent to stating that every arriving
customer believes that there are M additional customers, where
qm := P(M = m) =
(m+ 1)πm+1
E[N ]
.
See [33] for discussion and details on games with a random number of players. A special case
is that of of a Poisson distributed population, which is appropriate when many customers
join independently with a small probability, and then qm = πm.
If all customers arrive at the same time then the unconditional (on the number of total
customers) probability of any customer to be the i-th customer in service is
pi :=
∞∑
n=i−1
qn
n + 1
=
1
E[N ]
∞∑
n=i
πn =
P(N ≥ i)
E[N ]
, i ≥ 1 .
An individual customer’s cost when all arrive at time t < 0 is then
cpi(t; t) = β
∞∑
i=it+1
pi+1(t+ i)− γ
it∑
i=0
pi+1(t+ i) , (4)
16
where, as before, it = max{i : t + i − 1 ≤ 0}. A customer arriving momentarily before all
others incurs a cost of −γt. If P(N > it) > 0 then the only other feasible deviation is to
arrive at t = 0, which yields a cost of
cpi(0; t) = β
∞∑
i=it+1
qi(t+ i) .
As −γt decreases with t and cpi(0; t) is increasing, −γt
e = cpi(0; t
e) has a unique solution.
Furthermore, by continuity there is an interval τpi = [t, t] of pure symmetric equilibria, where
cpi(t; t) = cpi(0; t) and cpi(t; t) = −γt.
The socially optimal symmetric strategy is given by minimizing cpi(t; t). Taking the
derivative of (4),
d
dt
cpi(t; t) = β
∞∑
i=it+1
pi − γ
it∑
i=0
pi ,
we see that cpi(t; t) is piecewise affine and unimodal with the minimizing t
∗, which is possibly
not unique, satisfying
β
∞∑
i=it∗+1
pi ≤ γ
it∗∑
i=0
pi ,
and
β
∞∑
i=it∗+2
pi > γ
it∗+1∑
i=0
pi .
If N ∼Poisson(λ), a Poisson sized population with mean λ, then the socially optimal
solution is often an equilibrium. Figure 5 illustrates the range of parameters, in terms of
β
β+γ
, for which the equivalence holds. When the population is small the social optimum is
only an equilibrium when the tardiness penalty is relatively small. This contrasts to the
deterministic case where it only holds for β and γ that are close (see Proposition 7 and
Figure 4). However, as λ increases this holds for all parameter values, as was the case for
the deterministic population. Interestingly, the minimal β
β+γ
such that the social optimum
is an equilibrium behaves approximately as ≈ e−λ (the solid blue line in Figure 5).
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Figure 5: Range of parameter values such that there is a socially optimal equilibrium. The
population size is a Poisson random variable with mean λ.
6.5 Heterogeneous customers and non-linear cost functions
Interestingly, it turns out that pure-symmetric equilibria exist even if the jobs have het-
erogeneous due dates and cost functions. However, the cost functions may not be “too”
heterogeneous, in the sense that the due dates must be “close” to each other, where the
exact definition of “close” depends on the population size and specific cost functions.
Assumption 9. For every customer i = 1, . . . , n the cost function ci satisfies the following:
(a) There is a due date di such that ci(di) = mins ci(s).
(b) ci(s) is continuous, unimodal, decreasing when s < di and increasing when s > di.
We focus on cost functions satisfying Assumption 9, which is a reasonable and non-
restrictive assumption for most scheduling and queueing scenarios. Without loss of generality
we further assume that ci(di) = 0 for all i = 1, . . . , n. For example, the asymmetric absolute
deviation cost function in (2), and the quadratic cost function ci(s) = (s− di)
2 both satisfy
Assumption 9. As before, let ci(t; t
′) denote the expected cost for customer i arriving at t
when all others arrive at t′.
Lemma 10. If Assumption 9 holds then for every customer i = 1 . . . , n there exists a non-
empty interval τi = [ti, ti] such that for any t ∈ τi,
ci(t; t) ≤ ci(t) ,
and
ci(t; t) ≤ ci(t+ n− 1) ,
where the interval bounds are given by the solutions of
ci(ti + n− 1) =
1
n− 1
n−2∑
j=0
ci(ti + j) , (5)
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and
ci(ti) =
1
n− 1
n−1∑
j=1
ci(ti + j) . (6)
Lemma 10 characterizes the interval of symmetric arrival times τi such that customer i
does not want to deviate from the common arrival time. A symmetric equilibrium is then
a time t such that t ∈ τi for all i = 1, . . . , n. The interval of equilibria can be determined
by computing all τi for all i = 1, . . . , n. Alternatively, it can be computed by solving a pair
of equations that we define in Proposition 11. The proofs of the previous lemma and of the
following proposition are in the appendix.
Proposition 11. The set of all pure symmetric Nash equilibria τ e has two equivalent rep-
resentations:
(a) Let τi = [ti, ti] as defined in Lemma 10, then τ
e =
⋂n
i=1 τi.
(b) τ e = [t, t] is given by solving
M(t) = m(t) =
1
n
,
where
m(t) = min
i=1,...,n
{
ci(t)∑n
j=1 ci(t+ j − 1)
}
,
and
M(t) = min
i=1,...,n
{
ci(t+ n− 1)∑n
j=1 ci(t + j − 1)
}
.
The socially optimal arrival schedule will no longer be achieved by all arriving at the
same time, because now the order of the jobs is important. The solution is given by the
mathematical program
min
s1∈R,φ∈Π
n∑
i=1
ci(s1 + φi − 1) ,
where Π is the space of permutations of (1, . . . , n). This formulation assumes that under
the optimal schedule the server operates continuously, i.e., that the due dates are not too
spread out with respect to the cost functions. Note that the social optimization problem is
generally intractable and requires heuristic or approximation methods (e.g. [14]).
Example 3. Suppose that n = 3 and that the players have a symmetric absolute deviation
cost function (β = γ = 1) and heterogeneous due dates, (d1, d2, d3) = (−0.25, 0, 0.25). Hence,
the cost functions are
ci(s) =


|s+ 1
4
|, i = 1 ,
|s|, i = 2 ,
|s− 1
4
|, i = 3 .
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To find the equilibrium use Proposition 11b:
M(t) = min
{
|t+ 1
4
|
|t+ 1
4
|+ |t+ 5
4
|+ |t+ 9
4
|
,
|t|
|t|+ |t+ 1|+ |t+ 2|
,
|t− 1
4
|
|t− 1
4
|+ |t + 3
4
|+ |t+ 7
4
|
}
,
and
m(t) = min
{
|t+ 9
4
|
|t+ 1
4
|+ |t+ 5
4
|+ |t+ 9
4
|
,
|t+ 2|
|t|+ |t+ 1|+ |t+ 2|
,
|t+ 7
4
|
|t− 1
4
|+ |t+ 3
4
|+ |t+ 7
4
|
}
.
It can be verified that M(−1) = m(−1) = 1
3
and therefore all arriving at t = −1 is the
unique symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium. N
Example 4. Suppose that n = 3 and that due dates are heterogeneous: (d1, d2, d3) =
(−0.5, 0, 0.5). We assume the following cost function,
ci(s) =


β
(
s + 1
2
)2
1(s < −1
2
) +
(
s + 1
2
)2
1(s > −1
2
), i = 1 ,
s2, i = 2 ,
(
s− 1
2
)2
1(s < 1
2
) + β
(
s− 1
2
)2
1(s > 1
2
), i = 3 ,
where β > 1 is a parameter. The cost function can be interpreted as follows: Player 1 wants
to start earlier but pays a larger penalty for early service. Player 2 wants to start at zero and
has a symmetric deviation penalty. Player 3 wants to start later but has a larger penalty for
starting late.
Compute first τ2 = [t2, t2]. By (6),
1
2
[
(t2 + 1)
2 + (t2 + 2)
2
]
= t
2
2 ⇒ t2 = −
5
6
,
and by (5),
1
2
[
t22 + (t2 + 1)
2
]
= (t2 + 2)
2 ⇒ t2 = −
7
6
.
We conclude that τ2 =
[
−7
6
,−5
6
]
. Applying (6) and (5) yields t1 ≥ t2 if β ≥ 2.125 and
t1 ≤ t2 if β ≤ 46. Therefore τ1 ∩ τ2 6= ∅ if and only if β ∈ [2.125, 46]. Similarly for i = 3 we
find that t3 ≥ t2 if β ≤ 46, t3 ≤ t2 if β ≥ 2.125 and τ3 ∩ τ2 6= ∅ if and only if β ∈ [2.125, 46].
If β = 5 then t1 = t3 = −1, hence τ1 ∩ τ3 = −1 and t = −1 is the unique equilib-
rium. If β ∈ (5, 46] then there is a non-empty (and non-singular) interval τ e ⊆
[
−7
6
,−5
6
]
of
equilibrium arrival times. Lastly, if β < 5 there is no pure symmetric equilibrium. N
A special case of interest is considering homogeneous due dates with heterogeneous lin-
ear deviation penalties. Applying the equilibrium conditions of Proposition 11 yields the
following characterization of the pure strategy equilibrium interval.
20
Proposition 12. Suppose each customer i = 1, . . . , n has an earliness penalty γi and tardi-
ness penalty βi. If the deviation penalties are ordered as follows,
γ1
β1
≤
γ2
β2
≤ · · · ≤
γn
βn
,
then the set of pure strategy equilibria (which may be empty) is
τ e = [tn, t1] ,
where tn is given by (5) and t1 is given by (6).
7 Conclusion
We analyzed a decentralized scheduling game with each customer choosing when to join a
single server queue with the aim of minimizing his deviation from a due date. We find that
when the due dates are close and the penalty for deviation is the significant factor in the cost
function, and not the waiting cost, then in equilibrium customers arrive simultaneously. This
contrasts with the literature on queue arrival timing games, specifically the ?/M/1 model
of [16], and the subsequent works reviewed in Section 2, where the solution is typically a
mixed strategy, that is, customers randomize their arrival times. This result is only due to
the unimodality around the due date of the cost function, which results in a random draw
for order between the customers benefiting everyone. As shown in our sensitivity analysis,
as long as the waiting costs are sufficiently small, this holds even under the standard ?/M/1
assumptions of exponential service times, Poisson distributed population size and (small)
waiting costs, .
This model can be extended in several directions. Considering multiple servers, com-
plementary to the centralized analysis surveyed in [27], seems straightforward, but may be
technically challenging. Another interesting extension has multiple servers combined with
routing, centralized or decentralized. An additional direction is to consider customers be-
longing to groups with common due dates that are not close between the groups, but are
not too far so there is still interaction. The question is then will groups arrive together in
equilibrium but not at the same time as other groups?
Appendix - Proofs
Proof of Lemma 3.
(a) If the server did not so operate, then all customers incur positive expected cost, but
any single customer could achieve zero cost by arriving at zero.
(b) If there is no service for some interval before zero, then the expected cost at the end
of the interval is less than the expected cost at the beginning of the interval, thus
contradicting the equilibrium assumption. The reverse argument holds for such an
interval after time zero.
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Proof of Lemma 4. We separately prove the lemma for the cases of pure and mixed strate-
gies.
1. Suppose that nx ≥ 1 and ny ≥ 1 customers arrive at instants x < y, respectively.
Without loss of generality assume no one arrives before x or during (x, y), and that
y − x < 1 (Lemma 3b). The latest possible service time of customers arriving at x is
x+nx−1, and this is also the earliest possible service time for customers arriving at y.
If x+nx−1 < 0 then arriving momentarily after x is better than x, otherwise arriving
momentarily before y is better than arriving at y. Hence, such an arrival profile cannot
be an equilibrium.
2. A mixed strategy for customer i is given by a randomization of arrival times and is
represented by a cdf Fi. If Fi is a best response to the strategy of all other customers
then the cost at every time of its support is constant, and at least as high at any
time not in the support. If customer i arrives according to the mixed strategy Fi,
and customer j arrive according to Fj , then there is some t < 0 such Fi(t) > Fj(t)
(w.l.o.g.) and Fi(s) = Fj(s) ∀s < t. The cost of arriving at any time s < t is equal for
both, but different at t, so if Fi(t−) = Fj(t−) > 0 then the equilibrium assumption is
contradicted. If Fi(t−) = Fj(t−) = 0 then the support of customer i starts at time
t and the support of j starts at some time s > t. Customer j prefers arriving at s
to arriving just before t, but this implies the same for customer i, contradicting the
equilibrium assumption.
Proof of Lemma 5. A symmetric mixed strategy is given by a distribution function F such
that all customers randomize their arrival times according to it. Due to Lemma 3a there
is a pair of values ta and tb, where −(n − 1) < ta < tb < 0, such that all customers arrive
between them with probability one, i.e. F (ta) = 0 and F (tb) = 1. If n− 1 customers arrive
according to F then a single customer arriving at time t should incur the same expected cost
at any point in the support of F . Using the same arguments as in the proof of Lemma 4
we can rule out distributions with “holes”, i.e., an interval (s1, s2) such that F (s1) = F (s2)
where ta ≤ s1 < s2 ≤ tb. Moreover, atoms in F are not possible either, specifically t such
that limδ→0 F (t − δ) 6= F (t). The impossibility of atoms arises because if there is an atom
at t then arriving just before t should have the same cost as arriving at t and right after
it; however arriving at t dominates at least one of the other options because it includes
a lottery for all the customers that arrive at t. We are left with continuous distributions.
Let F be a continuous distribution with support t ∈ [ta, tb], such that ta < 0 by Lemma 3.
The probability of 1 ≤ k ≤ n − 1 arrivals during an infinitesimally small interval [t, t + δ)
is approximately
(
n−1
k
)
(f(t)δ)k. Hence the probability of a single arrival is approximately
(n− 1)f(t)δ+ o(δ) and of k > 1 arrivals is approximately o(δ). Therefore the change of cost
by arriving δ after ta instead of ta is
−γδ + (n− 1)f(ta)δ
(
β(ta + 1)1{ta≥−1} − γ(ta + 1)1{ta<−1}
)
+ o(δ) ,
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hence dividing by δ and taking δ → 0 we get that the marginal change in cost is
−γ + (n− 1)f(ta)
(
β(ta + 1)1{ta≥−1} − γ(ta + 1)1{ta<−1}
)
,
and thus ta ≥ −1, as otherwise the marginal change in cost would be negative and not zero.
Similarly, because tb > ta ≥ −1, arriving δ before tb will result in a change of approximately
−βf(tb − δ)δ + o(δ) ,
which is always negative. Therefore for some sufficiently small δ the cost at tb − δ is smaller
than at tb; F cannot be an equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 7. In Proposition 1 we saw that the socially optimum solution need not
be unique, in particular when nβ
β+γ
is an integer. But in any case the strategy of all arriving
together at t∗ = −
⌊
nβ
β+γ
⌋
is socially optimal. We shall verify the conditions for t∗ to be a
symmetric arrival time and show that when this is not the case there is no other socially
optimal arrival time.
1. If β
β+γ
< 1
n
then t∗ = −
⌊
nβ
β+γ
⌋
= 0. However, t = 0 is not an equilibrium point as long
as β > 0 and γ > 0, because any single customer can guarantee an arbitrarily small
cost by arriving momentarily before the others. Similarly, if β
β+γ
> 1 − 1
n
= n−1
n
then
t∗ = −
⌊
nβ
β+γ
⌋
= −(n−1). Here again, t∗ cannot be an equilibrium because a customer
can arrive during (−(n−1), 0] and incur no cost. Furthermore, in both cases nβ
β+γ
is not
an integer and t∗ is the unique social optimum, and as such no equilibrium is socially
optimal.
2. If n = 2 then the condition is only met if β = γ, in which case we already established
that the unique equilibrium te = −1
2
is also socially optimal.
3. Suppose n > 2 and β
β+γ
∈
[
1
n
, 1− 1
n
]
. Then the social optimum is given by an integer
−(n − 2) ≤ t∗ ≤ −1. The total cost is nc(t; t) and thus minimizing the total cost is
equivalent to minimizing the average cost per customer. Let k = −t∗, andm = n−1−k.
Then k ≥ 1 is the number of early arrivals and m ≥ 1 is the number of late arrivals.
Note that as t∗ is an integer there is always a job that starts at exactly zero and has
no penalty. If all arrive at t∗, then the average cost of early start times is
γ
k
k∑
i=1
i =
γ(k + 1)
2
,
and the average cost of late start times, including the one at zero with no penalty, is
β
m+ 1
m∑
i=0
i =
γm
2
.
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Hence, a customer’s expected cost is
c(t∗; t∗) =
k
n
·
γ(k + 1)
2
+
m+ 1
n
·
βm
2
=
k + 1
n
·
γk
2
+
m
n
·
β(m+ 1)
2
.
For t∗ to be an equilibrium the average would have to be smaller than both of the
extremal penalties γk and βm. By addressing all possible cases, we next prove that
this property indeed holds.
i. If γk = βm then clearly the average cost is smaller than both. Each of the
extremal values is smaller than the respective earliness or lateness penalty: γk >
γ(k+1)
2
and βm > βm
2
.
ii. If γk > βm then arriving earlier than t∗ yields a cost that surely exceeds the
average. Furthermore, we argue that the extremal late penalty is at least as large
as the earliness average penalty: βm ≥ kγ
2
. Otherwise, kγ > β2m ≥ β(m + 1),
but this contradicts the optimality of t∗: setting t = −t∗ + 1 would reduce the
cost by replacing the early penalty kγ with a smaller later penalty β(m+ 1). We
conclude that if γk > βm then the average cost is smaller than both extremal
penalties, and thus no deviation is beneficial.
iii. If γk < βm then the arriving later than t∗ is clearly not a good deviation. We
further argue that the earliest penalty is also at least as large as the average of
lateness penalties: γk ≥ βm
2
. If the inequality holds for k = 1 (and m = n − 1)
then it holds for all values of k. Indeed, if k = 1 and γ < β(n−1)
2
then 2γ < β(n−1)
and the cost can be reduced by setting t∗ = −2, which results in replacing the
highest late penalty β(n−1) with a smaller early penalty 2γ. Lastly, we conclude
that γk ≥ c(t∗; t∗), as required.
Proof of Proposition 8. Recall that all jobs arriving at t is an equilibrium if no deviation to
a different time is beneficial for any single customer. Specifically, arriving a moment before
all others does not yield lower cost then arriving at t and joining the lottery for order:
−γt ≥ c(t; t) ,
and the same is true for arriving later and being served after all other jobs:
β(t+ n− 1) ≥ c(t; t) .
The first condition is met for any t ≤ t, the second condition is met for any t ≥ t, and
τ e = [t, t] is the interval of all possible equilibria in the unrestricted model. The arguments
presented here can be assisted by considering the illustration of the cost terms in Figure 2.
(a) If τ r = [a, b] ∩ τ e 6= ∅ then t ∈ τ e for any t ∈ τ r, and thus by Proposition 6 any such
time is an equilibrium.
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(b) If a > t then
β(a+ n− 1) > c(a; a) ,
and so arriving after a is not desirable. This is a sufficient condition for equilibrium as
arriving before a is not allowed.
(c) If b < t then
−γb > c(b; b) ,
and so arriving a moment before b is not desirable. This is a sufficient condition for
equilibrium as arriving after b is not allowed.
Proof of Lemma 10. Recall that when all arrive simultaneously, they are processed in uni-
form random order and that the cost for customer i is
ci(t; t) =
n−1∑
j=0
1
n
ci(t+ j) =
1
n
ci(t) +
1
n
n−1∑
j=1
ci(t + j) ,
hence,
ci(t; t) ≤ ci(t) ⇔
1
n− 1
n−1∑
j=1
ci(t+ j) ≤ ci(t) .
By part (b) of Assumption 9 ci(t) is decreasing for all t < di; therefore by part (c) there
exists some ti such that
1
n− 1
n−1∑
j=1
ci(ti + j) = ci(ti) ,
and 1
n−1
∑n−1
j=1 ci(t + j) < ci(t) for all t < ti, where ti is given by (6).
Similarly,
ci(t; t) ≤ ci(t+ n− 1) ⇔
1
n− 1
n−2∑
j=0
ci(t+ j) ≤ ci(t+ n− 1) ,
and as ci(t) is increasing for t > di there exists a ti such that
1
n− 1
n−2∑
j=0
ci(ti + j) = ci(ti + n− 1) ,
and 1
n−1
∑n−2
j=0 ci(t + j) < ci(t + n − 1) for all t > ti, where ti is given by (5). Furthermore,
(6) implies that
ci(ti + n− 1) >
1
n− 1
n−2∑
j=0
ci(ti + j) ,
and we thus conclude that ti ≤ ti, and therefore τi = [ti, ti] 6= ∅.
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Proof of Proposition 11.
(a) This is a direct result of Lemma 10. Arriving at t is a best response for customer i if
all others arrive t for any t ∈ τi, hence if this holds for all i = 1, . . . , n then t is a Nash
equilibrium.
(b) If t is an equilibrium then
ci(t) ≥ ci(t; t) =
1
n
n∑
j=1
ci(t + j − 1), ∀i = 1, . . . , n ,
which is equivalent to
ci(t)∑n
j=1 ci(t+ j − 1)
≥
1
n
, ∀i = 1, . . . , n ,
or
min
i=1,...,n
{
ci(t)∑n
j=1 ci(t+ j − 1)
}
≥
1
n
.
Similarly, the second equilibrium condition,
ci(t+ n− 1) ≥ ci(t; t) =
1
n
n∑
j=1
ci(t+ j − 1), ∀i = 1, . . . , n ,
yields
min
i=1,...,n
{
ci(t+ n− 1)∑n
j=1 ci(t+ j − 1)
}
≥
1
n
.
We conclude that the boundaries of the interval τ = [t, t] are as stated in the proposition
statement.
Proof of Proposition 12. For any − 1
n−1
< t < 0,
ci(t+ n− 1) = βi(t+ n− 1) ,
and
1
βi
ci(t + n− 1) = t+ n− 1 =
1
βk
ck(t + n− 1), ∀k 6= i .
Condition (5) is equivalent to
1
βi
ci(ti + n− 1) =
1
n− 1

 n−2∑
j=iti+1
(ti + j − 1)−
γi
βi
iti∑
j=1
(ti + j − 1)

 .
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If γk
βk
≥ γi
βi
then
ti + n− 1 =
1
βi
ci(ti + n− 1) ≥

 n−2∑
j=iti+1
(ti + j − 1)−
γk
βk
iti∑
j=1
(ti + j − 1)

 ,
and thus
tk + n− 1 =
1
βk
ci(tk + n− 1) =

 n−2∑
j=it
k
+1
(tk + j − 1)−
γk
βk
it
k∑
j=1
(tk + j − 1)

 ,
implies that tk ≤ ti. As this argument can be repeated for any pair we have that
t1 ≤ t2 ≤ · · · ≤ tn .
The same type of argument applied to condition 6 yields
t1 ≤ t2 ≤ · · · ≤ tn .
We conclude that
τ e =
n⋂
i=1
τi =
n⋂
i=1
[ti, ti] = [tn, t1] .
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